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Defining Man as Animal Religiosum in English Religious Writing c. 1650–c. 1700 
R. J. W. Mills 
 
All students learning logic in seventeenth-century England would have imbibed the definition 
of man as animal rationale (rational animal).1 While the definition was used to explain 
differentia from genus, it fitted in with scholastic orthodoxy’s position that man’s possession 
of a rational soul was the principal means of establishing the difference between humans and 
animals. The distinction was a staple of the anthropocentric Christian world view.2 This article 
explores a related development that took place in England during the middle decades of the 
seventeenth century: within a variety of writings with religious themes and across the 
continuum of Protestant thought, man was frequently re-interpreted as best classified not as 
animal rationale but as animal religiosum (religious animal). The following is not an 
examination of when and how English Christians started thinking about man as a creature able 
to be religious, but rather an investigation of the moment when theologians felt the need to 
explicitly define man as a religious animal. While the understanding of man as a religious 
creature was widely available to early modern theologians through a variety of patristic, 
classical and contemporary sources, it is striking that the specific definitions animal religiosum 
and animal capax religionis (animal capable of religion) became widely used from around 
1650 onwards. Initially the definition was used by writers as part of doctrinal polemics. The 
definition of man as animal religiosum was used subsequently in the 1660s and 1670s by 
numerous scholars attempting to understand the implications of animal rationality. 
The aim of this article is to chart the usages of this re-definition of man, analyze the 
reasons for why the definition emerged and the different roles it played for different people in 
different contexts, and offer some suggestions for why it fell into comparative disuse by the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. It proceeds not by focusing on specific genres of writing, 
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but by exploring usages of animal religiosum, divinum animal, animal capax religionis, 
‘religious animal’ and ‘religious creature’ identified during the period. In exploring the explicit 
redefinition of man as animal religiosum and animal capax religionis in mid-seventeenth-
century England the following breaks new ground by going beyond the previous discussions 
of the topic in two ways. It might appear at first that one potentially productive way to think 
about why seventeenth-century English religious writers started defining man as animal 
religiosum as opposed to animal rationale would be to examine the debate over animal 
rationality. Much research has shown how the purported ability of animals to reason raised 
serious moral and theological concerns about their relative status to humans, and the possibility 
that animals might have immortal souls.3 This scholarship has been supplemented by work 
exploring the satirical purpose to which theriophily could be applied – such as by the Earl of 
Rochester in his A Satyr Against Mankind (1675).4 Yet this ample scholarship on seventeenth-
century English understandings of human-animal relations often downplays the importance of 
disputes between theologians.5 The below will make the case, firstly, that it is a mistake to view 
the reclassification of man as animal religiosum as solely resulting from a desire to protect the 
anthropocentric great chain of being in the face of some unnerving arguments about the 
reasoning capabilities of animals. The definition of man as a religious animal did not have to 
relate to concerns about the anthropocentric world order, and often instead played a role in 
theological disputes about the relationship between religion, reason and human nature. 
By re-inserting the theological element in this discussion, this article has new things to 
say about the sudden popularity of defining man explicitly as animal religiosum. Secondly, in 
the process, it also aims to correct an earlier misinterpretation of the definition as being bound 
up with the much-disputed categories of ‘Cambridge Platonism’ and ‘Latitudinarianism’. Man 
as animal religiosum has regularly been discussed in scholarship on the ‘Cambridge 
Platonists’.6 The most sustained treatments of the topic advance the thesis that the leading 
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‘latitude-men’, such as Benjamin Whichcote and John Smith through to the Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, re-defined man as animal religiosum and animal capax religionis as part of their 
campaign to demonstrate the alignment of true religion and reason.7 The two categories – 
‘Cambridge Platonism’ and ‘Latitudinarianism’ – have come under serious challenge in recent 
decades. It has been conclusively shown that the appeal to reason was not limited to those 
defined as ‘latitude-men’, nor did they privilege reason over inspiration, works over doctrine, 
or ecumenical inclusiveness over confessional conflict in the manner set out in earlier 
influential Anglican scholarship on the period.8 The coherence of the categories as describing 
groups of philosophers and theologians with shared intellectual interests and a common 
philosophical language has been challenged too, with the extent of their utility being limited to 
them describing groups of theologians and thinkers only bound together by tutorial 
relationships, friendship, patronage and marriage.9 While many of those sometimes classified 
as ‘latitude-men’ do appear in the below, it is striking that man was being defined as animal 
religiosum by writers across the continuum of Protestant thought in seventeenth-century 
England, from puritans and nonconformists to various shades of non-‘latitudinarian’ 
Anglicanism. 
A third proposition offered here is that there are two distinct periods in the discussion of 
man as animal religiosum. The categorization of human nature appeared in mid-seventeenth-
century England usually, though not always, in the writings of theologians who were battling 
over the correct characterization of man’s relationship with God. By the late 1660s, the 
definition of man as a religious animal increasingly appeared as part of debates about the 
relative standing of man and beast. Of particular importance here are the writings of close-
friends and neighbors Sir Matthew Hale (1609–1676), the famous common law judge and 
philosopher, and the nonconformist minister Richard Baxter (1615–1691). In contrast to the 
more theological discussions of the mid-century, Hale and Baxter attempted to re-substantiate 
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the difference between man and beast in response to recent writings about the reasoning 
abilities of animals. While both were concerned about Cartesian and Gassendian mechanistic 
theories of animal nature, in their views on animal rationality in particular they were prompted 
to do so by two treatises by the French physician and lay religious writer Marin Cureau de la 
Chambre (1594–1669). Noticeable here was their strategic willingness to adopt the animal 
religiosum definition, while at the same time rejecting arguments in favor of animal reasoning. 
The discussion below suggests a modification is needed to the influential view that “the 
Restoration Englishman,” not just the ‘Cambridge Platonists’ and ‘Latitudinarians’, took 
inordinate pride in being “rational” by showing additionally the impact of the potential 
reasoning capabilities of animals. In many cases, reason was not enough to be proud about.10 
The specific distinction of man as animal religiosum or animal capax religionis had 
largely disappeared in English theology by the early eighteenth century. A detailed account of 
why is beyond the purview of this article, though some tentative suggestions are offered about 
how the categorization fell out of use in the pulpit and in the works of philosophers and divines: 
scholastic reasoning fell out of fashion, and the focus of apologetics moved from atheists to 
deists. This article, in sum, is a contribution to our understanding of those significant debates 
over the difference between men and beasts, and the relationship between religion and human 
nature in seventeenth-century English theology. It charts the rise and speculates on the fall of 
a distinct categorization of human nature and suggests, at least initially, the overriding concern 
was not only with new attitudes or experiences of animals themselves but also with theological 
disputes. Only later in the century did shots across the bow of the anthropocentric worldview 
lead to recalibrations by some theologians of just why humans were special. 
The apparent parochialism of focusing on religious texts published in seventeenth-
century England is justified on the grounds that, while absences are impossible to prove, the 
appearance of discussion of man as animal religiosum, animal capax religionis, ‘animal 
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religieux’, ‘animale religioso’ and so on in texts produced on the continent is very limited, 
especially when compared to the English example. One can find scattered instances of man 
being defined as an ‘animal religieux’ in French-language texts. For example, in the first 
volume of his work of Christian humanism which dealt with understanding the relationship 
between sacred and profane culture, La méthode d'étudier et d'enseigner chrétiennement et 
solidement les historiens profanes (2 vols., 1693), French Orationist Louis Thomassin 
emphasized that man’s inherent religiosity as a means of explaining the otherwise apparently 
inexplicable religious practices of the pagans. In doing so, he aimed at rebuking arguments, 
associated with Pierre-Daniel Huet, which suggested the similar natural origins in reason of 
pagan and Christian belief.11 Before realizing the heretical dangers inherent in Huet’s position, 
Thomassin himself had set out similar arguments in his earlier discussion of man as a rational, 
religious creature in La méthode d'étudier et d'enseigner chrétiennement les lettres humaines 
(1681).12 Yet it seems Thomassin’s explicit definition of man as religious animal as opposed 
to a rational one is a rare case.13 Moreover, it seems that few seventeenth-century continental 
authors utilized the definitions animal religiosum or animal capax religionis. The development 
discussed below seems to be peculiarly English and, as we shall see, peculiarly short-lived. 
 
I. Whichcote, Smith and the Initial Appearance of Man as Animal Religiosum 
 
In terms of their sources, English-language attempts to find the essential difference in man as 
the uniquely religious animal should be understood with reference to two contexts: patristic 
apologetics and continental Reformed thought. Writing in 1656, John Evelyn noted the 
significance of Lactantius’s definition of man as animal religiosum in the current debate over 
the religious propensities of human nature.14 Discussion of the inherent religiosity of human 
nature was available to all due to its prominent status within the widely-utilized classics of 
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patristics, Lactantius’s Divinarum institutionum (b. iii, c. 9–10), and De ira Dei (c. 7).15 The 
Father’s discussion itself was in dialogue with another widely cited one about the uniquely 
religious nature of humans: Cicero’s De legibus (1.8.24).16 And it was to Cicero, rather than 
Lactantius, that many of the authors below aligned themselves. Cicero’s discussions of man as 
divinum animal in De finibus (II.41) were regularly cited in anatomical works surveying the 
various summaries of human nature, though this definition of man did not appear in the 
religious writings surveyed here.17 Lactantius’ and Cicero’s texts were well-known sources and 
were frequently cited in English publications from the 1640s onwards.  
The second sources of discussion were those emerging out of Reformed and Anti-
Reformed debate on the continent. Calvin had emphasized that it was only worship of god that 
rendered “men superior to brutes.” Without worship, men were not only on the same level as 
beasts but “in many respects far more miserable.”18 While the Reformed tradition following 
Calvin would not inherit his rejection of reason, English Calvinists tended to repeat this means 
of differentiating man from beast. Followers of Arminius, similarly, would have been aware 
that he had averred that man was principally a religious, not rational animal, in his ‘Fifth 
Oration’ (1606).19 Simon Episcopius claimed during the Synod of Dort in 1618 that religion, 
more than reason, was the distinguishing characteristics of man.20 This could be contrasted 
with the strong Socinian separation of religion and human nature, which positioned man as a 
species with no natural framing towards religion besides a reasoning faculty that could interpret 
scripture.21 Another influential discussion was Herbert of Cherbury’s De veritate (1624) which 
concluded that “religion is the ultimate difference in man” on the basis of the universal 
appearance of the worship of God.22 
Despite Evelyn’s summary to the contrary, none of these sources actually used the 
specific definitions of man as animal religiosum or animal capax religionis. One exception 
was Tommaso Companella’s summary of Lactantius’s discussion in Divine Institutes as 
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defining man as ‘animal rationale religiosum’ in Atheismus triumphatus (1631), but this was 
not mentioned.23 The first important discussions appeared in England, most likely, in the 
preaching of Benjamin Whichcote and John Smith. The Cambridge preacher Whichcote 
(1609–1683) defined man as animal religiosum as part of his outlining of a doctrine of theosis 
in his posthumously published Theophorymen dogmata (1685), also known as the Select 
Notions. These discussions would have been well known to Whichcote’s students at Cambridge 
in the mid-seventeenth century where he was a highly respected and influential figure.24 
Rejecting Plato’s definition of man as animal rationale given the evident “sagacity [in] inferior 
creatures,” humans were differentiated because “man alone … can take cognizance of God” 
and thus stood “higher by the head and shoulders” from brute creation.25 The “essential 
formality” of man is the “proper motion of the understanding” is “God-ward.”26 Whichcote’s 
discussion of animal sagacity here was not used to level man and beast – “for comparatively, 
[man’s] understanding is the best of the creation” – but to make the point that the perfection of 
man’s nature was “repose with God” (Deo assidere).27 Not reason per se, but reason directed 
to God distinguished man from the rest of creation.28 It was not appropriate to “define a man 
animal rationale … but animal religiosum, a religious creature.” 
Whichcote’s discussion has regularly been cited as characteristic of his anti-atheist 
apologetics and his optimistic stance on the reliability of reason in religious matters, in 
opposition to the Reformed doctrine of the depravity of human nature.29 Often in the story of 
Cambridge Platonism such discussion has de-theologized Whichcote’s understanding of reason 
and posited him as using reason in a secularized way akin to Cartesian rationalism. What is 
noticeable about Whichcote’s discussion here, however, is that his emphasis is primarily on 
explaining theosis. He is explaining the Christian vocation understood as the participation in 
the life of reason, through which one learns to be human. 
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Moreover, Whichcote’s specific definitional phrasing was not present in the known 
patristic and classical sources. The most commonly referred to passages of Cicero and 
Lactantius, for example, do not use the definition.30 Indeed, Lactantius’s own definition of man 
was animal intelligens et rationis capax (an intelligent animal and capable of reason).31 
Arguably, the move here was more than the simple regurgitation of a definition of man taken 
from readily available texts, but an act of definition-establishment at a moment when 
understanding human nature’s relationship with god and reason is being disputed in a major 
way. This rhetorical move is worthy of note: man as animal religiosum served Whichcote’s 
wider purposes of demonstrating the deiformity of common human nature through the 
participation in divine reason against the Reformed doctrines of depravity and predestination 
and against the religious enthusiasm of the age. Moreover, it seems plausible, given his well-
attested influence on his students, that Whichcote’s discussion of man as animal religiosum 
helped initiated the spread of the use of the definition.  
The Select Notions was published two years after Whichcote’s death by “Philanthropus,” 
who positioned himself as Whichcote’s former “pupil and particular friend.”32 Subsequent 
editors of Whichcote’s religious writings – Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury and the mid-eighteenth-century clergyman Samuel Salter – were doubtful about 
the extent to which the Select Notions reflected his mature thought or, indeed, whether the work 
was purely Whichcote’s own.33 Whichcote did not repeat the definition of man as animal 
religiosum in other posthumously published writings, though he set out a similar position about 
the positive relationship between religion, reason and human nature. In his Aphorisms 
(published 1753) Whichcote maintained that nothing was “more specific to man than the 
capacity of religion, and sense of God.” Without any mention of the possible rationality of 
animals, he aphorized that religion was “connatural to the frame of man” because it was 
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“agreeable to his reason” and was as “natural for a man” as it was for a “beast to be guided by 
his senses and instinct.”34 Similar discussion could be found in his Select Sermons (1698).35 
The re-definition of man as a specifically religious creature was pursued by Whichcote’s 
former pupil John Smith (1618–1652), but in the more cautious form animal capax religionis 
(animal capable of religion). Smith’s religious thought was characterized by his emphasis on 
practical divinity, an ecumenical stance on doctrine, and his belief in the positive relationship 
between reason and faith.36 His sermons were originally preached at the chapel of Queen’s 
College Cambridge in the late 1640s and early 1650s and were published posthumously as the 
Select Discourses (1660). The ninth of these, entitled “Of the Excellency and Nobleness of 
True Religion,” focused on the nobility of true religion and contained Smith’s discussion on 
the correct definition of man.37 His redefinition of man as animal capax religionis, a similar 
act of definition-creation as Whichcote’s animal religiosum, was a modification of Porphyry’s 
definition of man as a “rational animal, capable of intellect and science.”38 Similarly, Smith’s 
definition was repeated by subsequent authors, though it was not as prevalent as Whichcote’s 
use of animal religiosum. Smith’s former student Isaac Barrow agreed with his lecturer that 
man was a “creature capable of religion” because there appears an “instinct and capacity innate 
to man, (and, indeed, to him alone)” to want to “readily acquainted” with his divine parent.39 
Likewise, Edward Fowler, Bishop of Gloucester, and the theologian Herezkiah Burton 
paraphrased Smith’s account.40 And, as we will see below, another influential ‘latitude-man’ 
George Rust also shared this definition of man with Smith. 
As with Whichcote, Smith’s focus here was explaining the proper religious “way of life” 
intended for humans.41 Smith’s position differs, obviously, from the ontologically fixed nature 
of the definition of animal religiosum; Smith informs his audience that they merely have the 
potential to be religious, but that this requires both effort and divine grace. To fulfil his “own 
dignity and glory” as a deiform creature, the “good man endeavors to walk by eternal and 
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unchangeable rules of reason.” The human soul when “straightened within the narrow prison 
of sensual and corporeal delights” is corrupted and limited. By contrast, the individual soul that 
adopts the “proper motion of religion … upwards to its first original [i.e. God] … lives at the 
height of his own being.” And here is where Smith deemed the definitions of animal rationale 
and animal capax religionis as being of equal importance on the grounds that man’s religious 
nature was intimately bound up with his rational nature.42 Smith cited the opinions of Plutarch 
and Cicero, not Lactantius, to shore up his view that the “formal difference of man” could be 
found in the capacity of human beings to converse with God using their reason.43 These two 
sources acted as proof that reason was “enabling and fitting [for] man to converse with God by 
knowing him and loving him” and it was this that was the “character most unquestionably 
differencing man from brute creatures.”44  
Smith’s discussion appeared in a devotional work intended to aid young men in 
understanding their relationship with their God. His definition of man as animal capax 
religionis was part of an argument that reason and religion went together. Smith’s developed 
his position less in opposition to recent writings about animal reasoning than against stoic 
philosophy and Reformed thought.45 The stoic belief that reason could achieve terrestrial 
happiness through its control of the passions was predicated on a view of human nature’s 
rational self-sufficiency that turned the individual away from God and made an idol of himself. 
The true source of human felicity involved the progression of human nature’s religious 
capabilities towards their eventual perfection, reunion with God. The stoics negated the 
spiritual aspect of human nature and downplayed the real life of religion required of a deiform 
creature such as man. Smith also rejected the Reformed doctrines of the total depravity of 
human nature and the power and majesty of God. The perfection of human nature was the 
return to God, though Grace-assisted, which involved fulfilling the religious propensities of the 
species. Man had the capacity to be religious through the appropriate use of reason. 
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Another author writing in the mid-seventeenth century who described man as animal 
religiosum was George Rust (d. 1670), the subsequent Bishop of Dromore, in his posthumously 
published Discourse of the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion (1683). The work was written 
while Rust was at Cambridge and its contents were variously directed against enthusiasts, deists 
and Socinians. Less concerned with the doctrine of theosis like Whichcote and Smith, Rust’s 
principal focus was the epistemology of belief. His discussion of man as a religious animal 
came within an explanation of the role of reason in assent to religious beliefs. A positive 
relationship existed between right reason and religion because “faith consists in assent; the 
assent follows the judgement, but no judgement can be made of a thing that is not at all known 
or understood.” Rust’s citation pointed the reader to Herbert’s De veritate, though his position 
was a clear re-statement of the Arminian position on the mechanics of belief: faith involved an 
act of assent by the faculty of the intellect, in opposition to the Reformed position that faith 
was the result of God’s granting of grace. 
The distinction of man as animal capax religionis came within a discussion of the 
corruption of reason. An individual’s reason could be “blinded by lusts,” leading them to 
becoming an “animal man” whose reasons were guided only by sensual appetite. The faculty 
of “right reason,” by contrast, was able to discern divine law. The “principal difference between 
mankind and brutes” was not reason per se, then, but man’s “being capable of religion” – an 
animal capax religionis. Religion and reason went together when reason was directed in its 
appropriate fashion as a God-given spark that allowed for apprehension of the divine law. 
Religion was the “most natural and the sole propriety of man” and could not be “contradictory 
to his own faculties.” To argue otherwise was to claim that “God intended to perplex the 
humane intellect with inexplicable subtleties” and make people “put off human nature that we 
may become religious.”46 
Accepted for publication in Church History for publication in September 2019. 
 
13 
 
In each of the three cases discussed so far, the overriding concern was not that of dealing 
with anxieties relating to purported threats to the species boundary between man and beast. The 
re-definition of man as a religious creature by Whichcote, Smith, and Rust were theological 
explorations of man’s relationship with his maker. Reason thereby was identified with faith; 
the truly religious good individual lived in the manner befitting his nature as a human.47 Given 
the role that man as animal religiosum has usually played in existing scholarship on the 
‘latitude-men’ such as Whichcote, Smith, and Rust, it has to be also argued that the willingness 
to redefine the human species as a religious rather than rational animal was maintained by a 
wide variety of figures within English religious writing during the second half of the 
seventeenth century.48 Proponents of other variants of Anglicanism appealed to the 
categorization, as was the case with the mystic and Oxford divine John Pordage (1607–1681) 
in his posthumously published Theologia Mystica (1683) or another Oxford divine, the 
Arminian controversialist Thomas Pierce (1622–1691).  
To Pordage, a visionary who conversed with angels, our “reason, or faith, intellect, 
intelligible ideas and eternal verities” would never “conduct us to enter into paradise” unless 
they were bound together with “our affections.” The “old definition animal rationale” could 
not contain the full potential of man’s spiritual being, and hence Pordage wished to “define 
him … rather by religiosum” or “animal divinum.”49 Noticeably, Pordage viewed this 
definition as new. Pierce preached before the King in the 1679 on the spread of irreligiosity 
and atheism due to the “multitudes of deceivers” in Restoration England. Pierce’s target were 
the “disciples of the book which is called Leviathan” and its author, and his usage of man as 
animal religiosum was principally an argument of anti-atheist apologetic. Thomas Hobbes’s 
materialist understanding of human nature in Leviathan (1651) dispensed with the notion of 
immaterial spirits.  One way to rebuke this argument was for Pierce to maintain that “the 
perfectest definition of man as man” was “animal religiosum, which still includes rationale.” 
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The whole framing of human nature was suited to religious belief and worship and, as such, to 
believe in religious doctrine of the existence of immaterial spirits was to be human. Hobbes 
and his supporters, therefore, were “monsters.”50 These examples are evidence of the wide 
usage of the precise definition of man as animal religiosum. 
The definition of man as the uniquely religious species was, equally, appealed to by the 
Reformed. They tended to maintain that man had innate knowledge of a deity, though this 
knowledge was faint and often hidden beneath the general depravity of human nature. 
Moreover, while man’s natural religious propensities allowed for belief in God, faith only truly 
followed upon an act of redemptive grace granted by God. The scattered discussions amongst 
Reformed writers during the 1640s and 1650s tended to accept the possibility of semblances 
of animal rationality, but strongly averred that only humans were religious creatures. The 
former Parliamentarian soldier and subsequent lay writer on religious topics Edward Leigh, in 
his Treatise of Religion (1656), held that religion alone “distinguishes a man from a beast” 
given that many animals have a “shadow of reason, but religion is peculiar to man.”51 Leigh’s 
Treatise of Religion was dedicated to Archbishop Ussher, whose own Body of Divinity (1645) 
maintained that “beasts have some sparkles or resemblance of reason, but none of religion.”52 
The Presbyterian Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge, John 
Arrowsmith, maintained in his Armilla Catechetica (1659) that the definition of man as a 
“creature addicted to religion” was a more appropriate categorization than “man [as] a living 
creature endued with reason” given the universality of religion, comparative to the use of 
reason.53 He did so as part of an argument to demonstrate that, given this universality of belief 
amongst the world’s religions, true religion was not known by “natural reason” but through 
access to “divine and supernatural revelation.”54 
Similarly, the definition of man as animal religiosum was utilized by numerous 
prominent Presbyterian ministers during the Restoration. Richard Baxter held, in his The True 
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and Only Way of Concord of All the Christian Churches (1680), that “man is naturally animal 
religiosum, made to serve God in order to future happiness.”55 As we shall see in the next 
section, Baxter was one of the most frequent discussants of the redefinition of man as animal 
religiosum in the latter decades of the seventeenth century. Often this appeared as an anti-
atheist proposition. The popular preacher Stephen Charnock, in his two-volume Discourses 
upon the Existence and Attributes of God (1682), concurred that the definition of “animal 
religiosum” was a reasonable inference from the universal consent in the existence of God. 
Religion was so bound up with reason that “a man cannot be accounted rational, unless he own 
an object of religion.”56 In the first volume of his The Living Temple (1675), John Howe used 
as a proof for the truth of religion the fact that so many people have “accounted [religion] the 
most constituent, and most distinguishing thing in human nature” rather than reason.57 It was 
more absurd to admit the existence of an “irreligious man” than a “rational beast.” The thrust 
of Howe’s usage was an anti-atheist point: those who deny a deity abandon “their own 
humanity; … by saying there is no God, [they] should proclaim themselves no men.”58  
We find discussion of man as animal religiosum just as frequently in mid-to-late 
seventeenth-century Reformed theology as we do in the writings of the ‘latitude-men’ or other 
anti-Reformed religious writers. While Whichcote, Smith, and Rust used their discussions to 
assert the positive relationship between reason and religion, the focus of the Reformed writers 
discussed above was primarily to use the definition as an argument in anti-atheist apologetic. 
This should indicate the various rhetorical uses to which the definition could be put, and 
certainly warn against any interpretations that limit its associations to those of the ‘latitude-
men’. 
 So far, this article has been concerned with indicating how man as animal religiosum 
was used by both Reformed and Anti-Reformed.59 Following its appearance in the 1650s, the 
definition quickly became a popular tool to make a number of interrelated arguments. The first, 
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as has been established, was the use of the definition of man as a religious animal in anti-atheist 
apologetics, usually used in conjunction with the proof for the existence of god from the 
consensus gentium. The universal consent of humankind in the existence of God demonstrated 
that the ultimate difference between humans and animals was religion.60 Conversely, if humans 
were uniquely religious animals, those who were not religious were less than human.61 A 
second common use of the categorization of animal religiosum appeared in works of devotion 
and practical divinity intended to encourage and chide the individual into pious belief and 
worship. The pious life was the good life, befitting to human nature; the sensual life was one 
of distraction and dissatisfaction, fitting only for beasts.62 A comparable example could be 
found in Mark Hildesley’s Religio Jurisprudentis (1685), an example of the tradition of 
layman’s faiths, in which the lawyer Hildesley, ostensibly writing for his son, explained that 
“animal religiosum” was a “more proper definition of a man than animal “rationale” because 
“1. [Religion] belongs unto all men. 2. It belongs only unto mankind. 3. It belongs at all times 
unto man. 4. It belongs necessarily to men; but sociability or rationality possibly do to others 
besides man.”63 The third prominent use was the deployment of animal religiosum in 
arguments about how man’s essential religious nature led to specific requirements for church-
state relations. Because man was essentially a religious creature civil society was formed, in 
part, for the purpose of organized religious worship. National religious institutions maintained 
by the government were necessary for the happiness and perfection of human nature.64 
 
II. Man as Animal Religiosum amidst other Reasoning Animals 
 
Definitions of man as animal religiosum and animal capax religionis frequently appeared in 
the immediate decades after the Cambridge preaching careers of Whichcote and Smith. Most 
of these took animal rationality as a proven phenomenon needing incorporation into the 
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understanding of human nature. A new emphasis, however, appeared in discussion from the 
1660s onwards: the need to rebut arguments about animal rationality that were seen to 
challenge the anthropocentric worldview.65 The issue had achieved a newfound prominence.  
To one pamphleteer writing in the 1690s, recent attempts to collapse the “essential difference 
between man and other animals [strike] at the whole of religion, and renders that unnecessary, 
and man contemptible.”66 To argue that animals could reason raised the possibility that man 
might be the same as the rest of creation, and that animals too might have rational, immortal 
souls. Contrastingly, a disputant in a debate over the Cartesian beast-machine hypothesis 
published in the Athenian Mercury in 1693 stressed that there were no heretical consequences 
to arguing that “brutes have immaterial souls and are rational thinking creatures.” Man, unlike 
the brutes, was created in the image of God and hence “by the prerogative of his nature” is a 
being “capable of religion.”67 An alternative explanation was the beast-machine thesis 
associated with Descartes. The view that animals were automata devoid of soul or reason raised 
associations with the Epicurean hypothesis – seen to have been given unnerving plausibility by 
Hobbes’s Leviathan – of a mechanical universe that brought into question all notions of 
immateriality. A third alternative, and the one adopted by Matthew Hale, was some form of 
nuanced modification of the Aristotelian tripartite soul to allow for evidence of animal 
rationality while retaining human reasoning superiority. From the 1660s onwards, there is more 
clear evidence of theologians and philosophers believing they needed to offer a coherent 
position on the status of man vis-à-vis beast. 
A useful bridging case here is that of John Wilkins (1614–1672). Appointed Bishop of 
Chester a few months earlier, Wilkins preached before Charles II in February 1669 on the topic 
of man’s essential nature.68 He told his audience that the definition of man could be “rendered 
as well by the difference of religiosum as rationale.” Religion was the essence, duty, and 
happiness of man. Given the clear evidence of “degrees of ratiocination” amongst “many brute 
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creations,” it was necessary to emphasize that what defined man was not “reason in general” 
but reason “as it is determined to actions of religion.”69 While Wilkins’s discussion utilized the 
same religiosum definition as his close friend Whichcote70, he stressed the need to reassert the 
anthropocentric worldview by using the definition to underline where man comes in the “rank 
of creatures.”71 This became even clear in the expanded discussion, which incorporated the 
1669 sermon, in Wilkins’s posthumously published Of the Principles and Duties of Natural 
Religion (1675). The definition of man as animal religiosum was used against “such persons 
as are sceptical in [the] first principles” of morals and religion – the first mention of skepticism 
in discussions of man as animal religiosum thus far. Sceptics doubted the religious principles 
of truth and falsehood, good and evil, and yet, Wilkins averred, it was these beliefs in which 
“a rational being does consist.”72 A work of anti-atheistic natural theology, Wilkins’s 
Principles and Duties was written “in opposition to that humour of skepticism and infidelity, 
which hath of so late abounded in the world.”73 We can also find a similarly more pronounced 
concern with distinguishing between man and animal in Henry Hallywell’s annotations, 
probably written in 1682–83, to his aforementioned translation of George Rust’s Discourse on 
Truth.74 
Two of the lengthiest explorations in later seventeenth-century religious writing that 
incorporated the definition of man as animal religiosum discussed in more depth the possibility 
and meaning of animal reasoning. These were found in the works of Sir Matthew Hale and 
Richard Baxter. Hale discussed the appropriate definition of man in his celebrated work of 
natural theology The Primitive Origination of Mankind (1677).75 He had strong personal links 
with at least two of the figures discussed above, Whichcote and Wilkins, as well as Baxter.76 
Hale probably had his friends Whichcote and Wilkins in mind when he claimed that the view 
that man could accurately be defined as animal religiosum had been put forward recently by 
“some latter persons” and “some thinking men.” Responding to the growing prominence of 
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writings about animal rationality, Hale rejected any levelling of animal and human rationality 
on the grounds that the “reason in the brutes” was the “image and analogical representation of 
that true reason that is in man.”77 Apparently rational behavior in animals was just the “image,” 
the simulacrum, of real human reason. Animals could not reason in terms of universals and 
incorporeal things in the way that humans could – and hence, as Hale put it in his manuscript 
treatise ‘A Discourse of Religion’ (c. early 1670s), animals did not show “any signs thereof” 
of religious belief and worship.78 The “specifical difference” of human nature from the rest of 
creation was not reason but the “propension to religion.”79  
The concern for Hale, in Primitive Origination especially but in his other devotional 
writings too, was to re-affirm that God had made man as a religious, rational animal to “serve 
and glorify his maker [more] than other visible creatures.”80 This was a necessary move 
following the spread of philosophical writings which undermined man’s superior status to the 
beasts. To do so he re-asserted an Aristotelian take on the soul, but with an added emphasis on 
the key role that man’s innate religious propensities had on framing religious belief and 
worship. Man’s “intellective faculty” placed him above brute creation. The key point here was 
not that humans had reason but that “lodged in the intellectual and rational nature” of man’s 
soul were numerous internal aids, communes notitiae (common notions), enabling religious 
belief. Man’s innate religious notions meant he should be defined as animal religiosum, 
“arising from the energy of those infinitae notitiae relating to God.”81 Hale downplayed the 
comparison between human and animal reasoning and reasserted a broadly Aristotelian 
understanding of the soul. In the process he switched the emphasis away from reason per se 
and towards the innate moral and religious propensities of the intellective faculty. 
In his Dying Thoughts (1683), Richard Baxter developed his earlier claim that “those 
men seem to be in the right who … make animal religiosum to be more of his description than 
animal rationale.”82 A close friend and intellectual interlocutor of Hale, his neighbor in the 
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village of Acton, Middlesex from 1667, Baxter’s position was similar to that set out in Hale’s 
Primitive Origination. The Dying Thoughts were written by Baxter to provide himself with 
comforting thoughts on his putatively imminent earthly demise. One constant theme was the 
place of man within the rank of creatures possessing an immaterial soul that meant man was 
“differenced formally from all inferior substances.”83 Like Hale, Baxter held animals 
demonstrated “analogical reason” which, though it was an inferior form of reason, still meant 
that man could not be defined unproblematically as animal rationale. Rather, like Hale, Baxter 
argued that humans are formally different from animals because their reason is “exercised 
about things of a higher nature, than the concerns of temporal life.”84 The end of humans was 
to obey and worship God; those who do not do this “live not as a man, but as a brute.”85 They 
could not “think of God” like man. Unlike Hale, Baxter stated himself persuaded, in his Dying 
Thoughts at least, by the writings of recent French ‘sceptics’ that animals had the ability to 
reason. These writings had shown that the real categorization of man as a “higher species” 
should be predicated on man not being the possessor of reason but by “having his nobler reason 
for higher ends.”86 And it was these arguments that were behind Baxter’s modification of his 
understanding of human nature from animal rationale to animal religiosum. 
 
III. Debate Over the Reasoning Abilities of Animals 
 
The discussions of Baxter, Hale, Hallywell, and Wilkins written during the Restoration were 
characterized by a greater concern with responding to recent arguments about the reasoning 
abilities of animals that those written in the 1650s. While Hale and Baxter acknowledged the 
extensive body of ancient writings that levelled man and beast’s reasoning abilities, they both 
discussed as of particular significance the recent works of the French physician and lay 
religious writer Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1594–1669).87 Cureau penned a particularly 
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influential thesis that tweaked the Aristotelian understanding of the soul, in which he argued 
both for the existence of limited reasoning capabilities in animals and for the unique ability of 
man’s reason to develop knowledge about higher things. 
The position of late Aristotelianism at the beginning of the seventeenth century remained 
the view that the human soul had a tripartite nature, being made up of three sets of differing 
faculties. The human soul had: vegetative faculties, of nutrition and reproduction, which it 
shared with the animals and plants; sensitive faculties, such as memory, movement, perception, 
which were shared with other animals; and, finally, the human soul was unique in its possession 
of intellective faculties, such as the capacity to reason about both corporeal and incorporeal 
objects of knowledge and to exercise will. Such an explanation provided a coherent and still 
persuasive anthropocentric world view.  The Aristotelian position on the existence of animal 
souls was directly challenged by the ‘beast-machine’ thesis of René Descartes.88 He denied that 
animals had souls or reasoning ability, rejecting such arguments as unwarrantable acts of 
anthropomorphism. Descartes positioned his denial of animal souls as an argument against 
atheists who wished to level man with the “flies and ants.”89  
The precise nature of animal souls and animal faculties were a cause of common concern 
for Hale and Baxter. They had corresponded, amongst other things, over Baxter’s manuscript 
treatise ‘Of the Nature and Immortality of Humane Souls” (c. 1669–1672). Towards the end of 
composing this treatise, Baxter read and responded to Thomas Willis’s De anima brutorum 
(1672), which offered a Gassendian theory of the corporeality of animals’ sensitive souls. 
While Willis had argued for the existence of an incorporeal rational soul, Baxter and Hale 
shared the concern that Gassendi and Willis’s position, like that of Descartes, offered a 
corporeal explanation of sensitive souls which potentially lead to a slippery slope to enabling 
the materialization of human rational souls. This was especially the case given that the sensitive 
souls of brutes were, as Baxter put it in a letter to Hale written in the early 1670s, “so neere kin 
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to ye Rationall, as to have Analogicall Reason” – a position which Willis held himself too.90 
The best foundations for defending species difference, Baxter claimed, was that the human soul 
alone had natural propensities to achieve deiform perfection impossible in the sublunary world 
– that is, as Baxter put it in a number of other works, that man was animal religiosum. 
While Baxter and Hale were concerned by the new theories of animal and human souls 
being offered, their shift from animal rationale to animal religiosum was encouraged primarily 
by the issue of animal rationality, a sub-argument within the larger issue of the nature of animal 
souls. Indeed, it is striking how willingly the writers assessed above accepted the position that 
animals could reason. Perhaps illustrative of their greater concern over the meaning of animal 
reasoning, Baxter, Hale and Wilkins all cited considerably more authorities than the writers 
from the 1640s and 1650s discussed above. Hale, for example, referred to the ancients 
Porphyry, Plutarch, and Sextus Empiricus, and the sixteenth-century Venetian Platonist 
Francesco Patrizi as all arguing that “reasonableness [was] not the specifical difference of 
human nature.”91 The most commonly cited ancient source was Plutarch’s ‘That Beasts Make 
Use of Reason’ in which Gryllus argued that reason was a facet of animal nature. It is also 
possible that men like Wilkins, Hales and Baxter were responding to the humility-encouraging 
writings of theriophiles like Montaigne and Pierre Charron, though they were not mentioned 
by name.92 
The most important works, for Hale and Baxter at least, were those of Cureau. The French 
physician was a figure of considerable contemporary standing within the Courts of Louis XIII 
and XIV, possibly one of the founder members of the Académie des Sciences and was well-
known for his theories of animal rationality.93 Cureau’s first take on animal reason was a 
lengthy appendix entitled “De la connoissance des animaux” attached to the 1645 second 
edition of his Les caractères des passions (1640). This started a dispute with a more obscure 
physician Pierre Chanet over the cognitive abilities of animals. Chanet had originally attacked 
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Pierre Charron’s views on animal rationality in his Considerations sur las sagesse de Charron 
(1643). Following Cureau’s 1645 appendix, Chanet penned a repost entitled De l’instinct et de 
la connoissance des animaux (1646). To Chanet, animal actions should be understood in terms 
of a providentially-framed instinct, not reason. Moreover, Cureau had destroyed the doctrine 
of man’s immortal soul by removing the essential difference between man and beast. Stung by 
this accusation, Cureau penned Traité de la connaissance des animaux (1648).  
Cureau was a well-intentioned Christian who defended the view that animals could 
reason as a necessary step in developing an accurate understanding of the natural world and 
thereby providing a “more solid foundation” for man’s dignity.94 As part of this Cureau rejected 
“one of the most ancient maxims of philosophy, that defines man as a rational animal.”95 While 
it was clear that both man and beast had reason, their cognitive abilities differed so 
tremendously that he did not conclude that there were any inconveniences to believing that 
beasts reasoned.96 This position involved the innovative reworking of Aristotelianism: Cureau 
attributed to the animal sensitive soul certain basic reasoning capacities that would normally 
be the preserve of the human rational soul.97 Animals could undertake acts of reason by their 
faculty of imagination.98 These acts were limited to specific corporeal objects. Humans could 
undertake acts of reason by their faculty of understanding. The understanding, unlike the 
imagination, has the power to “form general notions.”99 Man could not be defined by reason 
per se, but specifically by possessing the “faculty of reasoning universally,” given that the 
“faculty of reasoning simply” was shared with the beasts. Moreover, because of its ability to 
make universal notions, the faculty of the understanding should be understood as “spiritual.” 
The conclusion was simple: “reason is not the specifick difference of Man, but such a species 
of Reason, to wit universal Reason.”100 Man’s higher reasoning marked “the spirituality and 
immortality of his soul.”101  
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Both Hale and Baxter were thoroughly familiar with Cureau’s work. It is not clear 
whether they were using the French original or, more likely, the English translation of Cureau’s 
Traité entitled A Discourse of the Knowledg of Beasts published in 1657. The translation was 
printed by Thomas Newcomb, who had published translations of Cureau’s other works, as well 
as the first English translation of Descartes’ A Discourse on Method in 1649. Newcomb added 
a lengthy prefacing essay that summarized Cureau’s arguments and defended their Christian 
orthodoxy. Both Hale and Baxter, by contrast, took a more guarded position. To Hale, the 
“ingenious and learned” Cureau was the leading figure amongst all writers, ancient and 
modern, of the view that animals had a “reasoning faculty or power.”102 Hale discussed 
Cureau’s Traité within a chapter aiming to demonstrate the “excellency of human nature in 
general.”103 He summarized “two extreme opinions” on animal nature. The first was the 
Cartesian view that animals are “no more but barely mechanisms or artificial ensigns [and] all 
their various motions but the meer modifications of matter.”104 Cureau was the leading 
proponent of the second, opposing view that denied that “reason to be the specifical or 
constitution difference of the human nature.” Hale observed that Cureau had distinguished 
between the “ratio imaginativa” of brutes, which “keeps still in particulars, and within the 
verge of particular propositions and conclusions,” and the “ratio intellectualis” of humans, 
which “hath to do with universals.”105 
Characteristic of the exploratory and expansive nature of the Primitive Origination 
generally, Hale’s own attempt to explain the sagacity of brutes was not consistent. He variously 
described the ability of birds to build nests and nurture their eggs “with the most exquisite 
reason and congruity” as both evidence that animals had “instrumental reason” and that animals 
had inbuilt instincts to undertake such action.106 In language like Cureau’s, Hale also accepted 
that animals have “imaginative reason” but stressed that this was a “low, obscure and imperfect 
shadow” compared to man’s reason.107 Yet his discussion ended with a strongly negative 
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assessment of the existence of animal reason. Hale argued that the “impulses of sense, memory, 
and instinct” covered all the “sagacities of brutes” and there was no need to appeal to “true 
ratiocination or discursive reason.” He criticized Cureau as one of those “witty men” who had 
“chymically extracted an artificial logick” out of the sagacity of brutish actions. Whereas 
Cureau offered examples of the sort of syllogisms a horse’s imagination could undertake when 
deciding to eat grass, Hale thought it far more plausible that the horse ate the grass 
instinctively.108 
In the face of Cureau’s arguments, Hale offered his own reworking of Aristotelianism. 
He listed eleven objects that fell under the perception of the faculty of the intellective (or 
intellect), a faculty which was solely possessed by humans. One key batch of mental objects 
animals did not have but humans did were “notions of a deity, and the results thereupon, 
namely, religion.”109 Hale’s understanding of the development of religious belief led to an 
illuminating comparison between animal and human nature. The rational soul of humans was 
full of connatural principles which, when functioning once an individual had reached maturity, 
led to the development of certain notions. The “rational instincts” in the soul that led to 
religious belief were comparable, Hale maintained, to the “animal instincts of brutes.” Put 
differently, humans believed in god as instinctively as the spider knew how to weave a web or 
a bird knew how to build a nest.110 
Baxter discussed Cureau repeatedly across his voluminous oeuvre, sometimes positively 
and sometimes critically, depending on the aim of the particular work in which the discussion 
appeared.111 In apologetic works intended to prove the truth of Christianity, such as Reasons 
for the Christian Religion (1667) and More Reasons for the Christian Religion (1672), Baxter 
positioned Cureau as a well-known sceptic of comparable threat to foundational Christian 
doctrines as Pierre Gassendi and Thomas Hobbes. In these works he simplified Cureau’s 
position as extolling that brutes were rational, and thereby removed the distinction between the 
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animal and human soul.112 In more philosophically exploratory works, and particularly his 
Dying Thoughts (1683), Baxter expressed his agreement with Cureau’s arguments, praising the 
convincing way that he “raises the reason of man” by stressing, despite the appearances of 
comparable reason amongst animals, that only man amongst the creatures had an “intellectual 
faculty” which tended to divine things. He would have found similar arguments in Chapter 6 
of Willis’s De anima brutorum. The redefinition of man as animal religiosum, for Baxter, was 
a way of circumventing having to provide an answer to the vexed question of explaining those 
actions of animals that appeared to involve “some kind of reasoning.”113 The point was that 
humans were deiform creatures, animals were not – regardless of whether they could reason. 
Certainly, the views of Baxter and Hale were more responsive to the issue of the precise 
characterization of how animal and human reason differed, than those of the 1650s, and the 
source of their concern here seems to have Cureau. Their engagements exemplified how 
discussion of man as animal religiosum often took place in a different context in the Restoration 
to that during the Civil War and Interregnum era. 
 
IV. The Disappearance of the Definition in Theological Writings 
 
The specific reclassification of man as animal religiosum was a new development, a rhetorical 
shift in argument over the relationship between human nature and religion, which took place 
between 1650 and the end of the seventeenth century amongst numerous English religious 
polemicists, theologians, and philosophers. The discussions of the 1650s noticed by John 
Evelyn tended to take place within the framework of doctrinal debate. As such, these 
discussions were not limited to the purview of the well-studied ‘latitude-men’, but rather a 
category available to and utilized by most sections of English Protestantism. The discussions 
of the 1660s to the 1680s were more frequently, though not always, concerned with the 
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consequences to the anthropocentric worldview of the possible reasoning abilities of animals. 
While contributions to a larger debate about animal rationality that included Descartes and 
Gassendi, these texts took as their main source the lesser-known Cureau. In both cases, this re-
examination of the precise quality of the uniqueness of man had less to do with Descartes’ 
beast-machine thesis and its strong separation of rational man in possession of an immortal 
soul and the automata of nature than current scholarship suggests. 
Scattered instances can be found of man being explicitly defined as animal religiosum 
and animal capax religionis by a miscellany of writers in the early eighteenth century.114 The 
most commonplace location to find discussion about explicitly defining man as animal 
religiosum was in magazines, newspapers and periodicals.115 The definition’s usage, however, 
ceased to be commonly appealed to in theological works exploring the relationship between 
religion and human nature.  This article will end with a few tentative suggestions as to why this 
might have occurred.  
The definition of man as animal religiosum or animal capax religionis might have fallen 
out of common usage in the early eighteenth century due to two consequences resulting from 
the widespread influence of John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690). 
Firstly, as the Essay became a textbook, theologians emerging out of the universities in the 
early eighteenth century would have been taught to focus on the operations of the mind more 
than on formal argumentative structures, resulting in a move away from repeated use of 
definitions such as homo est animal rationale and, by extension, homo est animal religiosum.116 
This is confirmed by the decline of usages of animal rationale as much as animal religiosum 
from the early eighteenth century onwards.117 Certainly the language of finding the differentia 
between the species of man and beast, given they shared the same genus of animal, and the 
attempt to find the ‘specifick’ distinguishing feature of man is less common as school reasoning 
fell out of fashion. Instead, many university students would have learnt from Book II of the 
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Essay to be sceptical about the possibility of identifying the “real essence, or substantial form, 
of man.” Secondly, the stringent critique offered in Book I of Locke’s Essay also had seriously 
challenged belief in religious innatism, either in the form of innate religious ideas or innate 
religious predispositions, which was often bound up with the definitions of man as animal 
religiosum or animal capax religionis.118 The Lockean understanding of religious belief as 
framed by exogenous factors made apologetic appeals made about the universal religious 
characteristics of human nature less plausible.  
Alongside Lockean innovations, anti-atheist apologetics had changed dramatically as 
new natural theological arguments set the appeals of religious innatism, universal consent and 
man as animal religiosum aside. The two key forms were the abstract a priori reasoning 
exemplified in Samuel Clarke’s two sets of Boyle Lectures (1704–5, 1705–1706) and the 
physico-theology, exemplified by John Ray or William Derham, that celebrated the abundant 
evidence of providential design in the natural world. In neither strand, and in the extensive 
sermon literature that utilized these approaches, was Christian apologetics seen as being 
strengthened by an additional appeal to man as animal religiosum. 
There is also a strong sense that the principal focus of apologetics had changed. The 
definition animal religiosum might have been useful as one of the many arrows launched 
against post-Hobbesian “atheism” in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. It became 
less useful as an apologetic argument, however, as the prominent challenges to orthodox belief 
changed at the turn of the eighteenth century. The threat was less the putative atheists and 
sceptics of the 1670s, who would be viewed as doubting the relationship between religion, 
reason and human nature, but the ‘deists’ and freethinkers of the 1690s onwards – figures who 
were held to believe in god, but not necessarily the Christian God of Scripture. Regardless of 
the coherence of ‘deism’ as a category, it is certainly the case that freethinkers such as John 
Toland, Anthony Collins and Matthew Tindal were viewed as claiming that only those religious 
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beliefs understandable by reason could be true.119 This epistemology of belief had problematic 
implications for theologians wishing to maintain the definition of man as animal religiosum.120 
A key example of this is Collins’ characteristically mischievous discussion of the definition of 
man as religious animal in his An Essay concerning the Use of Reason (1707).121 Collins used 
the commonplace and uncontroversial categorization to argue that calling for belief in religious 
truths “above reason” required man to go against his essential nature. The “very proper … 
distinction between men and brutes” was that “there are no signs of religion observable among 
brutes.” He went on to note that much orthodox religion “consists in the belief of propositions 
either repugnant to one another, or to propositions which we perceive to be true”. From here 
Collins provocatively concluded that assent to these propositions involved putting off “human 
nature” and hence it was problematic to argue that “religion can be said to be natural to man, 
when it is supposed to be contradictory to the perceptions of our faculties.”122 The unstated but 
clear meaning of this passage was that, given that man was a religious animal, something must 
be wrong about doctrines that were impossible for man to believe. The ‘deist’ subordination of 
revealed religion to the standard of reason lead to the growing preponderance of arguments that 
emphasized not the relationship between reason and religion, but the inadequacy of natural 
reason and the importance of revelation and the transmission of tradition. This position also 
grew in prominence during the related dispute, prompted in part by Locke’s Essay, over the 
origins of the knowledge of natural and divine law between the 1690s and 1710s.123  
In the early eighteenth century it was far less common to find an English religious writer 
confidently defining man as animal religiosum than it had been for any time since the 1650s. 
A redefinition of human nature that had emerged during the theological disputes of that decade, 
and then modified in the face of the greater prominence of debate over the significance of 
animal rationality in the Restoration, no longer seemed as apologetically apt in the face of 
deism and disputes over the origins of natural law. While eighteenth-century English 
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philosophers and theologians might still talk about humans as religious creatures, they had 
abandoned the scholastic language of man as animal religiosum and animal capax religionis. 
The phrasing might appear again occasionally towards the end of the eighteenth century, such 
as in Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), though the scattered 
nature of such usages contrasts markedly with the concentration of use in the mid to late 
seventeenth century.  
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